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The European Union and Russia:  the future  relationship 
Commission Communication 
Introduction 
1.1.  The ties that bind Russia and the countries of the European Union are centuries 
old.  In  matters  political,  cultural  and  commercial,  the  history  of Russia  is  closely 
intertwined with that of her European partners. Cooperation has been a fact long taken 
for granted, yet it has never been fully exploited, for reasons essentially linked to the gulf 
that,  in  Soviet times, divided the Western democracies from a totalitarian state. 
1.2.  In the short space of a decade, Russia has  undergone a far-reaching process of 
economic  and political  transformation.  Reforms  have  been put  in place,  though their 
integration and acceptance into post-Soviet society present considerable challenges. It  will 
take many years for Russia to overcome the Soviet legacy, and no certain prediction can 
be made about the road Russia will follow towards political and economic refonn. The 
key question is whether she turns inward upon herself, seeking to implement refonn and 
develop her economy with limited input of foreign expertise and investment, or whether 
she takes her place in the world economy in full  and responsible partnership with the 
European Union and others. 
1.3.  For  the  European  Union,  the  relationsrup  with  Russia  is  of !Ugh  significance, 
because: 
(i)  Russia  is  a  key  player on  the  world  scene,  being permanent  member of the  UN 
Security Council and nuclear power; 
(ii)  In  addition Russia is  a key  contributor to stability on the European continent as  a 
whole; 
(iii) Russia represents a considerable economic, commercial and scientific potential; 
(iv)  Moreover,  the European  Union  is  today  Russia's  main  trading partner  and,  with 
Finland's accession,  immediate neighbour. 
1.4.  It is time that the European Union and Russia recognized their historical vocation -~-------------------~------ --------~-----------
~ 
as the two principal European powers and, in the common interest, sought to develop the 
close  and  mutually  enriching partnership which  will  reflect  their political,  social  and 
economic significance,  while at  the same  time  demonstrating  the  responsiveness  and 
respect for human rights without which cooperation will remain unfulfilled and void of 
substance. 
In  this  context  the  recent  events  in  Chechnya  have  placed  a  considerable  burden  on 
current  relations  which  are  being  hampered  by  Russia's  insufficient  fulfilment  of 
frequently discussed conditions seeking to remedy the situation. 
1.5.  This Communication, which was announced at the informal meeting of  European 
Union Foreign Ministers in Carcassonne on 18-19 March, develops a strategy governing 
European Union/Russia relations for the coming years. Realization of this strategy must 
be achieved in joint endeavour with Russia and in close cooperation with the European 
Union's  principal  partners,  particularly  the  transatlantic  partners,  on the  basis  of the 
following objectives: 
the reinforcement of political,  social  and  economic stability  in  Russia and the 
countries of the region; 
sustained development leading to improved living standards for the population of 
Russia; 
enhanced  cooperation  in  addressing  the  major  regional  and  global  issues  of 
concern. 
In  this  respect  the  European  Union  recognizes  the territorial  integrity  of the Russian 
Federation while supporting its development as a state where minority rights are respected 
in accordance with internationally recognized principles. 
The  Communication  proposes  the  adoption  of a  Common  Position  (see  attached 
document) on relations between the European Union and Russia. 
Ru~sia: the  present situation 
2.1.  The process of change in Russia over the past decade has been fundamental, but 
a sustainable equilibrium has not yet been achieved. 
2  .1.1.  On  the political  side,  democratic  institutions  are  being built  up,  but  these are 
fragile and the rule of  law is often uncertain; indeed, a tradition of  authoritarian, secretive 
rule  reminiscent of earlier times seems to  have  gained  ground  in  recent  months.  The 
construction of  a civic society has begun, but still has far to go as a vital basis necessary 
for the success of political democracy. The military continues, as in Soviet times, to be 
of major  importance to  Russia's  political  life  and  absorbs  economic resources  out of 
proportion to what Russia can currently afford (an estimated 20-25% of  the 1995 budget). 
Organized crime and corruption are rampant, and indeed could undermine democracy and 
economic development if not dealt with effectively. 
As a heritage of  the Soviet empire, some 25 million people of  Russian origin live outside 
the borders of  Russia - a highly sensitive aspect of  Russian foreign policy - and some 150 
ethnic  groups  live  within  Russia's  borders.  Central  government had  made  progress  in 
improving relations with the diverse peoples of  the Russian Federation, but its actions in 
Chcchnya have  been  a  serious  setback  to  prospects  of the  Federation's  managing  its ---------------------------
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regional and ethnic diversity in a democratic and civilized way. 
Against  that  background  there  are  some  positive  elements.  The  menace  of nuclear 
confrontation has been removed, even though tens of thousands of nuclear weapons still 
remain, often in uncertain conditions of safety and storage, posing the threat of nuclear 
dissemination which would be difficult to control. Political debate is open and lively, and 
an independent press freely criticises government policies. Russian public opinion, now 
able to  inform and express itself,  is a new and important factor in Russian politics. 
2.1.2.  The Russian economy remains in a precarious situation. The new Russia inherited 
from the Soviet Union a decrepit industrial base that has wasted resources and produced 
a string of environmental  disasters,  and a heavily subsidised and startlingly  inefficient 
agricultural system that has failed to meet basic needs.  Almost three years after the onset 
of  reforms, progress has been achieved in many areas of  structural reform, including price 
liberalisation, sustained currency convertibility and privatisation. 
These reforms have changed the economic environment. Market forces are playing a key 
role in significant parts of  economic life. The underdeveloped services sector is expanding 
at a rapid pace, which is positive, even if  the explosive growth in areas such as banking 
causes concern in view of a lack of regulation and prudential supervision. On the other 
hand,  the  manufacturing  sector  has  contracted  sharply,  which  causes  serious  social 
dislocation, but is also an inevitable correction of Russia's bias towards heavy industry. 
Yet,  for  three  years,  macroeconomic  stabilization  has  proved  elusive.  Inflation  has 
remained much too high, fuelled by an excessive budget deficit which in turn was caused 
by  a  rollapse  in  tax  revenues  and  strong  spending  pressures.  Severai  attempts  at 
stabilization failed  in a fragmc,~ted and divided policy-making environment with many 
competing centres of  power. TI:.is has led to repeated policy reversals, and to the granting 
of costly privileges to sectoral  or regional  lobbies. 
The high level of capital flight  is evidence of the low level of confidence th2.t  Russian 
economic  operators  have  in  their  own  economy  and  indeed  in  the  economic  reform 
process.  Foreign  investors  can  scarcely  be  expected  to  enter  where  Russian  investors 
themselves fear to tread. 
The  immediate and  overriding economic policy priority  is to  end  inflation.  A virtuous 
circle must be launched, of  restored confidence, a return of flight capital, investment and 
restructuring.  The recent stabilization programme, supported for the first time by an IMF 
stand-by  arrangement,  provides  a  serious  chance  to  achieve  this.  Yet  it  will  be  a 
formidable  challenge  for  the  government  to  remain  united  and  committed  to  this 
programme as its initial contractionary effects will begin to be felt especially in the run-
up to the end-1995 and mid-1996 elections.  (See also Annex A) 
European Union/Russia: the current state of the relatiomhip 
3.1.  To  date,  the  European  Union  has sought to  develop  its  relationship with  Russia 
through a wide variety of linkages,  instruments and programmes: 
Contrcx:tua/ links - -------------------------
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The 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the USSR, offering MFN treatment for 
tariffs  and  duties  and  dialogue through  a Joint Committee,  still constitutes the  formal 
framework  for European Community/Russia relations. The Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement signed at Corfu in June  1994 ("the PCA") is much more ambitious in scope, 
covering a wide range of European Community/Russia trade, commercial and economic 
relations,  instituting  political  dialogue  at  various  levels  up  to  that  of Heads  of 
Government,  and  placing respect  for  human  rights  and  the  democratic  process  at  the 
centre  of the  relationship.  The  human  rights  clause,  to  be  found  in  both  the  Interim 
Agreement  and  the  PCA,  is  an  important  instrument.  It serves  as  a reminder of the 
fundamentals on which the relationship between the European Union and Russia is built, 
and, if necessary, enables either party to enforce those principles. Pending ratification of 
the PCA by the European Parliament and the national parliaments of  the Member States-
a process now delayed because of  the events in Chechnya - it is intended that an Interim 
Agreement  would  bring the  trade  provisions  of the  PCA  into  force.  Signature of the 
Interim Agreement is now also postponed, again in view of the human rights situation in 
Chechnya. 
Further progress with  respect  to the signing of the  Interim Agreement has  been made 
conditional on sufficient fulfilment  of a number of criteria:  conclusion of a cease-fire, 
progress towards a political solution, unhindered access for humanitarian assistance and 
establishment of an OSCE assistance group in Chechnya 
De facto,  even though the contractual framework constituted by the PCA is lacking, the 
political  dialogue  has  been  sustained,  from  the  time  of the  signature of the  Political 
Declaration signed by the President'> of Russia,  ttl.e European Council and the European 
Commission at Brussels in December 1993. This looked forward to establishment of "a 
permanent political dialogue and a system of regular consultations at different levels on 
the whole spectrum of political, economic and other issues of mutual  interest". 
Traie and comrr.:.?rce 
In the economic field,  the European Community has become by  far  the  largest trading 
partner of Russia, accounting,  in the first half of 1994, for 37% of the total of Russia's 
foreign  trade,  as  compared with 24% for  trade with  the other CIS  states, 6% for  trade 
with China,  4% for trade with the USA and 3% for  trade with Japan.  In  1993 exports 
from Russia to the  European Community reached  15.5 billion ECU and imports rose to 
11.5 billion ECU, leaving a balance in Russia's favour of almost 4 billion ECU. However 
there is concern over the low level of the European Community's tariffs on imports from 
Russia (average weighted tariff of less  than  1 %)  as  against  the continued  increase  in 
tariffs  imposed  on  Russia's  imports  from  the  European  Community  (average weighted 
tariff currently estimated  at  more than  18  %).  As the  majority of this  trade balance  is 
energy related, the European Community is already encouraging Russia to implement the 
European Energy Charter Treaty, its purpose being to create a legally binding framework 
to  foster trade and to encourage foreign  investment in the energy sector. 
The inflow of foreign investment continues to be low (around one billion US Dollars per 
:mnurn)  in relation to  Russia's size and  potential. ---- ----------
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A number of trade issues and commercial issues between the European Community and 
Russia  are  currently  outstanding.  These  include:  anti-dumping,  where  a  systematic 
dialogue  between experts has  been  initiated;  procedures for  testing and  certification, 
where  a  task  force  has  been set  up  to  propose  solutions  to  problems  resulting from 
excessive Russian requirements for  testing and certification procedures;  the effects of 
enlargement, where the Russian side takes a positive view in principle of  the present and 
future  European  Union  enlargement  but  seeks  to  alleviate  as  much  as  possible  the 
negative  consequences  on their  exports  to  the  new  Member  States;  trade  in  nuclear 
products,  although  the  conclusion  of the  Energy  Charter  Treaty  in  Lisbon  on  17 
December 1994 has contributed to solve a long-standing dispute between Russia and the 
European Community over the role of the Supply Agency and the interpretation of the 
Euratom Treaty as regards nuclear trade;  Siberia over-flying rights. 
Other fonns of  cooperation 
European Community/Russia cooperation has been built up through the implementation 
of numerous actions and programmes,  including Tacis,  Pan-European networks in the 
fields  of transport,  energy  and  telecommunications  and  on  other  issues,  including 
education  and  training,  the  environment,  energy,  humanitaria'1  assistance,  industrial 
cooperation, research and development, as summarized in Annex B. 
European UniolliRmsia relations:  further considerations 
Looking to future European Union/Russia relations, a number of considerations should 
be borne in mind: 
4.1.  Given the uncertainty of predicting, with any degree of  reliability, even the mid-
term fortunes of a country such as  Russia,  it  is  difficult to defme with confidence the 
European Union's medium-term strategy towards this country. An important factor will 
be  the  identity  and  persuasion  of Russia's  government  and  president  after  the  next 
elections.  Making due allowance for the weakness of Russia's democratic structures,  it 
seems likely that the tensions will remain between governance in Russia and observance 
of hwnan rights, between the centre and the regions,  between maintenance of political 
control and the growth of criminality. 
4.2.  In the security, political and economic contexts, this implies an intensification of 
effort  on the  part  of the  European  Union  in  order  to  take  greater  account  of the 
specificities of the European Union/Russia relationship, and to ensure that the Russian 
government and public opinion give due weight to Russia's relationship with the European 
Union. 
4.2.1.  Security 
It  is  important  th<tt  the  European  Union's  economic  strategy  towards  Russia  be 
coordinated with a political strategy that takes account of Russian security interests. 
Now that NATO enlargement in favour of  Central and East European countries is clearly 
envisaged, it  is necessary to take account of the concerns of the Russian government. If -- -----~-------------------
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NATO  enlargement,  however,  were  to  lead  to  Russia's  standing  opposition  and, 
ultimately, to a build-up of her military capabilities, the aim of greater European Union 
stability would  clearly  not be  achieved.  There  is  accordingly  a  need  to  intensifY  the 
dialogue concerning the development of  Europe's future security 3rchitecture, comprising 
such aspects as NATO enlargement, Partnership for Peace, OSCE strengthening and the 
development of relations between Russia and the Western European Union. 
The OSCE continues to establish itself as an  important organ of European security.  Its 
comprehensive approach to security, broad membership and high standards make it the 
appropriate forum for managing change and preventing the reemergence of  new divisions. 
The  ongoing  discussions  on  the  "security  model"  are  based  on  this  comprehensive 
definition of security.  The European Union  should continue to work to  strengthen the 
OSCE framework in which the role of Russia in European security is recognized. 
4.2.2.  Political 
It seems likely that,  in the coming months, the European Union's political  relationship 
with Russia will be overshadowed by  the tragedy of Chechnya, just as Russia's political 
scene is  likely to  be dominated by Chechnya in  the ruri-up to  two crucial events:  the 
legislative elections in December 1995 and the presidential elections in June 1996. During 
this period the European Union must strike a balance between giving expression to  its 
concern over Russia's breach of human rights in Chechnya, and the need to facilitate the 
process of reform in Russia. 
In order to be able to raise issues of  political concern in a timely fashion and in a manner 
which will have due influence, European Union-Russia relations will be best served by 
consolidation  of the  political  dialogue.  There  is  a  need  for  the  European  Union  to 
strengthen  its  ties  with  a  much  wider range  of Russian  leaders,  opinion  formers  and 
institutions both inside and outside government, both at the centre and in the regions of 
Russia, and to involve a greater number of  European UPjon and national institutions. The 
European Parliament has a special role to play, to build up contact with both the Dwna 
and the Federal Chamber, and thus to deepen the relationship with national and regional 
politicians. 
The issue of ethnic Russians  living outside the borders of the Russian Federation is  a 
deeply sensitive matter for  Russian public opinion, and one which is easily played upon 
by  nationalist politicians.  Here the  European  Union can play a  moderating role  in  the 
resolution of conflict through the exercise of its political  influence, as  it has in the area 
of Russia-Baltic  State relations  through  its  promotion of the  Stability  Pact,  and as  it 
continues to do through its declarations and demarches, based on close monitoring of  the 
situation.  Direct support might also  be provided by  the  European Community and the 
Member States,  for  example through the  financing  of language-training to  encourage 
integration and the acquisition of nationality. 
1l1e advance towards further European Union enlargement will prompt, with increasing 
urgency  in  the coming years,  questions  over the  weight  and content of the  European 
Union's relationship with all  the CIS  countries, and particularly Russia.  As  the effects 7 
of the process leading to enlargement begin to be felt by the Central and East European 
countries,  it  may  be expected that the  CIS countries will,  for  their part,  intensify their 
search for closer links with the European Union. Since accession is not, in the European 
Union's view, an option for those countries, the network of Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (currently signed with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine) must provide the framework which will  allow the bridging of the political and 
economic  gap  between  those  countries  acceding  to  the  European  Union  and  their 
neighbours to the East.  Participation in a wider European zone of prosperity can also be 
encouraged through regional  organisations such  as  the Baltic and  Barents Sea regional 
bodies. 
4.2.3.  Economic 
4.2.3.1.  European Union-Russia economic relations: 
The potential  for the future growth of European Community/Russia economic relations 
is great. To realize that potential will require the building up of  strong mutual confidence, 
so  that  investment of money  and  effort  in  the Russian  economy  can  be seen  by  both 
European  Community  and  Russian  business  partners  to  be  worthwhile.  Industrial 
cooperation between the European Community and Russia will be increasingly important 
to support the micro-economic pillar of  reform. Russia will have to increase its efforts to 
provide  stable,  transparent  and  predictable  framework  conditions  for  foreign  direct 
investors.  The  Tacis  programme  facilitates  the  development  of industrial  cooperation 
through  its  contribution  to  enterprise  privatisation,  restructuring and  modernisation  in 
Russia. 
Both  for  Russia  and  the  European  Community,  the  PCA,  once  ratified,  will  be  the 
framework  within  which  mutual  confidence  will  be  nurtured.  As  trade  grows  and 
diversifies from  its present narrow base,  it  is inevitable that differences will arise in the 
way  issues  are perceived.  It will  be  necessary  for  both parties to  make  full  use of the 
provisions of the Interim Agreement and the PCA to ensure that problems are addressed 
promptly,  in  ways  which  meet  the  interests  of the  European  Community  and  Russian 
economies. 
It is worth noting that the two parties to the PCA are due to hold a joint examination in 
1998,  to  see  whether  circumstances  allow  for  the  beginning  of negotiations  on  the 
establishment of a free  trade area. 
As bilateral  trade builds  up  between the European Community on the one side and the 
Central  and  East  European  countries  and  the  CIS  countries  on  the  other,  it  will  be 
important  not to  lose sight of the  trade  potential  that exists between the  CIS  countries 
themselves, and between them and the Central and East European col!ntries. It will be in 
the European Union's interest to encourage the resumption, in a manner appropriate to a 
market economy, of those links ruptured when the Soviet Union collapsed,  in  particular 
through encouragement of regional  and cross-border cooperation. 
4·.2.3.2.  Russia's  participation in the global economic system: 8 
As regards the institutional  framework regulating Russia's international trade links,  the 
main challenge facing Russia in the short to medium term is its accession to the WfO, 
a  process which  is  still  in  its  early stages.  The European Community has  started  a 
systematic dialogue with the Russian side to prepare the accession negotiations, which 
will  offer an additional opportunity to remove barriers limiting the access of European 
Community goods and services to the Russian market. It is politically committed to the 
process, both as a means of firmly integrating Russia into the world trading system aJ)d 
because  accession  to  the  wro will  further  underpin  the  domestic  reform  process. 
Nonetheless,  it  has  to be  recognized that the path to  membership  may be difficult at 
times. A rapid accession may imply Russia being asked to undertake .a large number of 
specific obligations  as  part of the  accession  package.  Over time,  and  as  the  reform 
process matures, the need for such specific disciplines will diminish. 
Russia  has  a  cooperation  agreement  with  the  OECD,  which through  its  expertise  in 
economic and trade matters can do useful work in helping Russia insert itself into the 
world economic system. Full membership could be envisaged once Russia has completed 
the process of accession to the wro. 
The G7 has been an important forum for discussing Western economics policy towards 
Russia.  It has played a useful  role,  particularly in  strengthening coordination between 
bilateral and multilateral donors, especially since the Tokyo Summit. Russia has expressed 
keen interest in taking an increasing part in G7 economic activity. This will however be 
dependent on Russia's achievement in the development of a market economy. 
1be European Union's objectives  and  priorities for the future  European  Unio~ia 
relationship 
5.1.  There is  consensus, as was demonstrated at the informal meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the European Union at Carcassonne,  that,  in the interest of the European 
continent as a whole, the European Union must conduct its relations vis-a-vis Russia so 
as to contribute to its evolution as a democratic and progressive nation. 
To this end,  in joint endeavour with Russia and in close cooperation with its principal 
world partners, particularly the transatlantic partners, the European Union should work 
towards achievement of the following interrelated objectives: 
reinforcement of political, social and economic stability in the Russian Federation 
and the countries of the region; 
sustained development leading to improved living standards for the population of 
the Russian Federation; 
enhanced  cooperation  in  addressing  the  major  regional  and  global  issues  of 
concern. 
ll1ese are objectives of which  the European Union must not  lose sight,  in  the face  of 
shorter-term difficulties in  the European Union-Russia relationship. 9 
5.2.  Certain priorities follow from the above objectives : 
the  further  involvement  of the  Russian  Federation  in  the development  of the 
European security architecture, the overriding aim being to avoid new divisions 
in Europe; 
the further development of democratic norms,  institutions and practices, and the 
respect of human rights, individual liberties and the rule of law; 
further  progress  towards  economic  reform  and  encouragement  of European 
Commtmity/Russia economic  interaction  in  order to  ensure Russia's  economic 
liberalisation  and  establishment  of the  market  economy;  and  its  growing 
participation  in  a wider European economic zone of prosperity,  and  the world 
economic system; 
the intensification of  bilateral and multilateral cooperation in other fields, inter alia 
justice, home affairs and crime prevention, and crisis prevention and management. 
the extension of  open and constructive dialogue at different levels and in various 
fora,  covering all  matters of common interest, in particular security, support for 
political and economic reform in the Russian Federation and the prevention and 
resolution of crises so  that the views of the European Union and the Russian 
Fede-ation are heard  in  time and  at  appropriate  level;  in  this  context,  seek to 
develop  the  political  dialogue  with  the  Russian  Federation,  pursuant  to  the 
political declaration signed by the Presidents of  Russia, the European Council and 
European Commission in Brussels on 9 December 1993. 
5.3.  A number of further steps are put forward as a means of implementing the above 
objectives and priorities in respect of European Union/Russia relations for the corning 
. years. 
5.3.1  Security 
The EuroF, Union should deepen discussions with Russia concerning the development 
of  Europe's future security architecture, comprising such questions as NATO enlargement, 
Partnership for Peace, OSCE strengthening and the development of  relations between the 
Russian Federation and the Western European Union. Russian hesitations over ratifying 
START II  and  implementing the  CFE Treaty,  indeed  any  retreat  from  internationally 
agreed undertakings particularly in the field of disarmament, should be met with a firm 
response.  Other  actions  in  the  security  field  include  cooperation  with  Russia  against 
nuclear smuggling, greater involvement of Russia in the multilateral regimes on nuclear, 
biological, chemical and  ballistic proliferation, as  well  as  its  membership of the 'New 
Forum' (post-COCOM regime on export controls). 
Following the  discussions  at  Carcassonne  the  European  Union  should  work  towards 
intensification of the dialogue  between Russia and NATO, notably in the context of the 
Partnership for  Peace and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.  In this context it  is 
worth  examining  fUrther  the  idea of a  specific  arrangement  between  Russia  and  the 
Atlantic  Alliance  which  would  set  up  regular  ad  hoc  procedures  of consultation and 
dialogue. 10 
5.3.2.  Political 
Because of  the length of  national ratification procedures, the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement could not, in the most optimistic of scenarios, come into force before 1997. 
The European Community's short term concern therefore limits itself to the question of 
the Interim Agreement and  its  signature. The purpose of the Interim Agreement is  to 
bring into  force  the trade  provisions of the  PCA,  in  the absence of which the  1989 
Agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  continues to  apply.  It  is  therefore of fimdamental 
importance, as has been made clear on several occasions to the Russian authorities, that 
the  conditions  for  signature  of the  Interim  Agreement  should  be  met;  for  this, 
responsibility rests squarely with the Russian Government. 
However, in the meantime, the European Community could take the necessary procedural 
steps to ensure that the Interim Agreement can be signed promptly and the European and 
national Parliaments can at once take up formal debate on ratification of  the PCA, once 
these conditions have been met. 
In the context of  support to the democratic process and the establishment of  human rights 
in Russia, the European Commission will continue to refme the implementation of the 
Tacis Democracy Programme (amounting to 11  MECU for 1995, of  which 55-60 %will 
be spent on actions in Russia). The programme is of  particular importance in the lead up 
to the forthcoming parliamentary  and presidential  elections.  In coordination with the 
Member States' own programmes, it will also support cooperation  between Russian and 
European opinion-leaders, parliamentarians and representatives of  governmental and non-
govemmental  organizai.ions,  both  at  the  centre  and  in  the  regions.  Equally,  new 
information actions will be implemented to ensure among Russian opinion-leaders and 
the public  a deeper knowledge of the European Union's involvement and concerns. 
The  European  Union has  in  the  past  supported  Russian  accession  to  the  Council  of 
Europe, though at a tir.1e  and in accordance with criteria to  be decided by the Council 
itself.  The  events of Chechnya have  halted  the  accession procedure.  The  Cotmcil  is 
already engaged in assisting Russia in order to improve mechanisms of democracy and 
human rights, in cooperation with the European Union. Once the Chechnya issue has been 
resolved, the European Union should again advocate Russia's accession. 
5.3.3.  Economic 
As regards economic issues, Russia has adopted a positive attitude in principle to current 
and future European Union enlargement.  For its part, the European Community should 
examine to what extent the increase of certain customs tariffs in the three new Member 
States reduces market access. This should be part of an overall analysis of trade issues 
including those arising from enlargement. One should also bear in mind that the European 
Community  is  concerned  by  a  number  of specific  problems,  notably  the  significant 
increase in tariff protection decided in  1994 and 1995  by Russia, the cost of which will 
have to be borne by European Community exporters,  as  well  as  by  excessive Russian 
requirements in the field of testing and certification which hinder trade. 11 
Should  signature  of the  Interim Agreement  be  substantially  delayed  due  to  lack  of 
progress on the criteria laid down by the European Union, consideration should be given 
to certain deadlines laid down in the PCA : 
the agreement to consider, in the course of 1996, the possibility of  granting MFN 
treatment for  mobile satellite services; 
negotiations on the stage-by-stage opening of inland waterways for international 
sea-river services should commence by the end of 1996; 
nuclear trade agreement: a specific nuclear trade agreement should be in place by 
I  January  1997,  the provisions of the  1989  Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
continuing to apply in the meantime. 
The  Commission  will  make  specific  proposals  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament to meet these contingencies  in due time before expiry of the deadlines. 
The new Tacis regulation should be adopted by the end of 1995,  in order to give new 
impetus to the programme. For the future, the sectoral and regional priorities of  the Tacis 
programme and types of project can be expected to evolve continuously, as experience 
accumulates and Russia's transition progresses. These devdopments cannot be identified 
in advance with any confidence, but certain trends can already be noted: 
The implantation of  the private market economy has taken place relatively quickly, 
with large-scale privatisation.  Particular attention must however be paid to the 
establishment of effective social policies mitigating the serious consequences of 
economic restructuring. 
There  has  been  rapid  emergence  of new  enterprises,  notably  in  the  banking 
services sector. In many sectors know-how is  now required at  a higher level of 
sophistication,  for  example  that  of financial  markets.  However  the  future 
development of the manufacturing sector continues to raise serious concern. 
Within the food and agricult'Jral chain, food distribution has now much improved, 
but the restructuring of the former collective and state farms has hardly begun. 
A continuing priority must be the education and training systems and scientific 
research, which has been gravely weakened by the lack of budgetary resources. 
Also regarding the institutional basis for  civic society and democracy there are 
major needs, which are now being identified more clearly. 
Regionally, Tacis is progressively opening up annual programmes in different important 
regions and this approach should be confirmed.  There are grounds also to facilitate the 
work of the  Baltic  and  Barents  Sea  Regional  organisations,  and  the  development  of 
certain Trans-European Networks. 
Regarding types of project, the emphasis should continue to shift in  favour of projects 
leading later to investment or actions that directly benefit Russian citizens, and away from 
surveys and studies that do not have lasting impact. 
Through Tacis assistance the European Community will continue to support Russia in the 
area of economic policy advice,  in  harmony with the work of the IMF, the EBRD and 
the other International Financial Institutions. 12 
The reinforcement of cooperation across the new common border between the European 
Union and Russia becomes a priority for  Tacis, and will  involve joint programming of 
the  Tacis  and  INTERREG  programmes,  and  the  promotion  of pilot  projects  for 
cooperation between  local  and  regional  authorities of the European  Union within the 
framework of an ECOS-Tacis programme. 
Monitoring and evaluation of  Tacis projects will be reinforced with a view to improving 
project preparation in the future and,  more immediately, to obtain value for money. 
5.3.4.  Other forms of cooperation 
The European Community is continuing its cooperation in many sectors with Russia Such 
forms of  cooperation (inter alia, environmental protection and nuclear safety, development 
of human resources, information technology and telecommunications, transport, science 
and research) are of common interest to both parties.  Telecommunications networks in 
particular  serve  as  a  vital  underpinning  of Russia's  economic  relations  between  the 
European Community and the rest of  the world. Such cooperation should continue, as a 
clear signal of support for the ongoing political and economic reform process in Russia 
Equally, fresh consideration should be given to the question of Russia's eventual access 
to certain of the European Community's financial  instruments, particularly in the context 
of the Trans-European Networks. 
Close  cooperation  between  the  European  Community,  the  CIS  states  and  Russia  in 
particular on energy issues is of  prime importance. The European Energy Charter Treaty 
is  an  important  instrument  in  this  respect;  ali  opportunities  to  make  use of Charter 
mechanisms, including resumption of negotiations for the so-called Second Stage of the 
Charter, should be fully utilized in order to ensure the rational and equitable exploitation 
of energy resources.  To improve the flows of investment into the vital Russian energy 
sector,  all  efforts  should  be  made  by  the  European  Community  to  arrive  at  liberal 
provisions on investment opportunities. 
Equally there is  a need for  further cooperation between the European Community, the 
Central and East European countries and  all  the  CIS countries, in order to combat the 
growing threat posed by  nuclear trafficking and  to  pursue the fight  against organised 
crime and drug smuggling. The European Community's own interests are also involved 
in working with Russia to improve her catastrophic environmental situation, thus to avert 
ecological threat in the event of military or civil  accident, and to avoid spillover from 
internal strife and economic deprivation in the  form of large-scale emigration. 
* 
*  * 
Accompanying document: draft Common Position on European Union-Russia relations 
* 
*  * 
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Drnft Common Position 
on the objectives and priorities of the European Union 
towards  the Rmsian Federnt:ion 
The  Commission,  in  fotwarding  to  the  Council  the Communication  on  the  European 
Union's  relations  with  the  Russian  Federation,  considers  it  necessary,  in  parallel,  to 
propose that the Council adopt a Common Position by virtue of  Article 1.2 of  the Treaty 
on European Union. Common Position 
defmed by the Coilllcil on the basis of  article 1.2 of  the Treaty on European Union on the 
objectives and priorities of the European Union towards the Russian Federation. 
(95/ ... CFSP) 
TilE COUNCIL OF TilE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular article 1.2. thereof, 
SETS OUT THIS COMMON POSITION : 
A The European Union will pursue the following objectives and priorities in its relations 
with the Russian Federation  : 
I. Objectives 
I.  The  European  Union  will  continue  to  pursue  the  objective  of deepening  and 
expanding  its  relationship  with  the  Russian  Federation,  with  the  aim  to  achieve 
partnership while respecting democratic principles and human rights; 
2.  In joint endeavour with the Russian Federation and  in close cooperation with its 
principal partners,  particularly the transatlantic partners, the European  Union will  work 
towards: 
reinforcement of  political, social and economic stability in the Russian Federation 
and the coillltries of the region; 
sustained development leading to improved living standards for the population of 
the Russian Federation; 
enhanced  cooperation  in  addressing  the  major  regional  and  global  issues  of 
concern. 
3.  1ne European  Union  recognizes  thereby  the  territorial  integrity  of the  Russian 
Federation while supporting its development as a state where minority rights are respected 
in accordance with internationally recognized principles. - -------~----------
•  I'JS 
n Priorities 
The  European  Union  lays  down  the  following  priorities  and  calls  upon  the  Russian 
Federation to work closely with it to achieve their realization : 
1.  the  further  involvement  of the Russian  Federation  in  the development  of the 
European  security  architecture,  the  overriding  aim  being  to  avoid  new  divisions  in 
Europe; 
To this end, it will seek to intensify the dialogue between Russia and NATO, 
notably  in  the  context  of Partnership  for  Peace  and  the  North  Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, and promote OSCE strengthening, and the d~velopment 
of relations between the Russian Federation and WEU;  and contribute, in this 
context,  to  the  further  examination  of the  idea  of a  specific  arrangement 
between the Russian Federation and the Atlantic Alliance Which would set up 
regular ad hoc procedures of consultation and dialogue; 
2.  the further development of democratic norms,  institutions and practices,  and the 
respect of human rights,  individual liberties and the rule of law; 
To this end, it will 
- support forms of  cooperation at various levels between Russian and European 
opinion-leaders, parliamentarians and representatives of  goverrnnental and non-
governmental organizations, both at the centre and in the regions; 
- promote and encourage fulfilment of conditions that will allow the Rw;sian 
Federation's accession to the Council of Europe; 
3.  further  progress  towards  economic  reform  and  encouragement  of European 
Union/Russia  economic  interaction  in  order  to  ensure  Russia's  economic 
liberalisation and establishment of  the market economy, while taking account of  the 
need  to  mitigate  the  social  consequences  of economic  reform;  and  its  gradual 
participation into a wider European economic zone of prosperity,  and the world 
economic system; 
To this end, it will 
- support  the  Russian  Federation  in  the  planning and  implementation of its 
agreements with the  IMF and the other international fmancial  institutions; on 
the  basis  of its  achievement  in  macro-economic  stabilisation  and  economic 
reform reassess Russia's membership of international grouping:; such as G7; 
- support  the  Russian  Federation  in  its  application  for  membership  of 
organizations such as wro; 
4.  the  intensification  of cooperation  in  other  fields,  inter  alia  the  tield  of crisis 
prevention and management; - ·1G 
To this end,  it will 
- explore the possibility of a moderating role for the European Union in the 
resolution of regional conflicts within the framework of the Stability Pact; 
- encourage regional cooperation between Russia and its neighbours, where each 
party freely recognises the mutual benefit of cooperation; 
- try to develop further cooperation with the Russian Federation in matters such 
as  the prevention of ecological disasters, and questions relating to migration, 
and the prevention of illegal activities, in  particul~ the fight against organised 
crime, the illegal traffic of  nuclear materials and drugs, illegal immigration and 
other offenses; 
-ensure the supply of  humanitarian assistance to the population in need through 
the  specialist  agencies  where  this  is  deemed  neces...c;ary,  in  addition  to 
Commwlity operations in these areas. 
5.  the extension of open and constructive dialogue at different levels and in various 
fora, covering all matters of  common interest, in particular security, European integration, 
support for political and economic reform in the Russian Federation and the prevention 
and  resolution  of crises  so  that  the  views  of the  European  Union  and  the  Russian 
Federation are heard in due time and &t appropriate level; in this context, seek to develop 
the political dialogue with the Russian Federation, pursuant to the political declaration 
signed by the Presidents of Russia, the European Council and European Commission in 
Brussels on  9 December 1993. 
B.  The  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  their national  policies  shall  conform to this 
common position. 
C. 1HE COUNCIL notes that the Community on the basis of  the Commission's initiatives 
will  contribute to the above objectives and priorities in particular through : 
1.  the taking of all necessary steps to ensure, at such time as the criteria laid down by 
the European Union have been substantially fulfilled, the prompt signature of the 
Interim  Agreement  and  early  ratification  of the  Partnership  and  Cooperation 
Agreement signed at Corfu on 24 June 1994; 
2.  the pursuit of its dialogue with the Russian Federation concerning its application for 
membership  of international  organizations,  including  the  current  application  to 
WfO; 
3.  implemention  of  programmes  in  support  of  the  democratic  process  and 
establishment of human rights  in  the 'Russian Federation,  on the basis ofamong 
others  the  EUs  Democracy  Programme  and  in  cooperation  with  the  relevant 
programmes  of the  Member  States;  and  support other  forms  of cooperation  at 
various levels between Russian and European opinion-leaders, parliamentarians and 1j-
representatives of governmental and non-governmental organizations, both at the 
cen1!e and in the regions; 
4.  continuing to refine and develop its technical assistance programmes, while working 
towards  more  effective coordination  betw~n donor organisations  implementing 
programmes with the Russian Federation, and in particular to ensure that the new 
TACIS regulation is adopted in due time, before the end of 1995; 
5.  working 'With  the  Russian Federation to  promote European cooperation aimed at 
ensuring the  rational  and  equitable  exploitation  of energy  resources,  within the 
framework of the European Energy Charter; 
6.  reconsidering the question of  the Russian Federation's eventual access to certain of 
the European Union's fmancial instruments, particularly in the context of  the Trans-
European Networks; 
7.  continuing to provide humanitarian assistance where necessary; 
8.  continuing to cooperate with the Russian Federation in the fields of education and 
training,  environmental  protection  and  nuclear  safety,  industrial  cooperation, 
information technology and telecommunications, transport, science and research; 
9.  implemention  of new  infonnation  actions  to  ensure  among opinion-leaders  and 
public in the Russian Federation a deeper knowledge of the European Union and 
its concerns; 
THE COUNCIL will undertake the necessary measures to promote the above-mentioned 
objectives and priorities, where appropriate on the basis of Commission proposals. 
C.  This Common Position shall be published in the Official Journal. 
Done  ~t Brussels, 
For the Council. 
The President. ·1 cg 
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Economic situation and economic refonn in Rtl5Sia 
During the past three years Russia has undergone major economic changes. Yet it is far 
from certain that it has found a sustainable path to a market economy. Liberalization has 
been only partial, and restructuring has not really started in any coherent sense. The lack 
of  a clear division of  power among various decision-making centres has led on  occasions 
to a reversal of the course of economic policy. The central authorities'  grip on Russia's 
regions has also diminished. As a result, the country continues to be affected by serious 
tax  revenue  shortfalls  and  waves  of  excessive  inflation.  Its  social  and  medical 
infrastructure has deteriorated, life expectancy has decreased, crime and corruption have 
reached alarming proportions, and there is disillusionment with reform. What is needed 
now  is  an  effective  macroeconomic  stabilization  package.  Recent  policy  has  made 
substantial progress in this direction, but the challenge is still formidable. 
The fall  in output came to an end in  1994. For the year as a whole GDP is estimated to 
have fallen by 15%., compared with a 12% drop in  1993. Five years of overall economic 
decline reduce.d  industrial  output  below 45% of its  1991  level.  However,  in the last 
quarter of 1994  and  in  the  first  quarter  of 1995  monthly  GDP  is  reported  to have 
stabilized, although it was still declining with respect to the corresponding periods of  the 
previous year.  Similarly, on a  monthly basis  industrial production has remained fairly 
stable since October 1994, which suggests that it may have bottomed out. 
The consequences of  the disorder affecting economic decision-making are quite clear if 
one  looks  at  1994.  A  relatively  lax  fiscal  policy  in  the  first  quarter of the  year was 
followed  by an attempt to  contain the  budget deficit by sharp spending cuts,  and to 
implement a  restrictive  monetary  policy.  As  a  result,  inflation declined  markedly,  to 
below 5% per month in August.  A renewed surge in  government spending and higher 
money  growth  in  the summer of 1994,  led again to  a  sharp acceleration of inflation 
during the latter part of the year and the beginning of 1995. It was also a factor behind 
the sharp fall  of the rouble in October 1994. 
The current policy stance is again much more restrictive. Monetary policy has been tight 
since the last part of 1994, and the fiscal deficit for the first quarter of 1995 is estimated 
at about 2.4% of GDP, against more than 9% in the first quarter of 1994. This has not 
yet led to a concomitant decline in inflation, which signals that inflation expectations are 
still high and that the government's credibility has been damaged by its performance in 
recent years.  Yet a  considerable effort is  currently being made.  The budget for  1995, 
finally approved by the State Duma in mid-March, envisages a deficit reduction that will 
require major adjustments on both the revenue and the expenditure sides. This should lead 
to a very sharp fall of inflation, to  l% per month by the second half of 1995. --------------------------------------
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1l1ese measures form part of  a wider-ranging economic policy package that should create 
the  conditions for  the .recovery of the  Russian  economy.  It  also envisages substantial 
liberalization  of the  external  trade  regime,  including  the  abolition  of quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exports,  the abolition of the system of special exporters for 
strategic  goods,  as  well  as  the  revision  of access  to  oil  pipelines.  Tax  revenue  gained 
from abolishing tariff exemptions and privileges is among the principal means of  reducing 
the budget deficit.  The  IMF  has  approved  in April  a stand-by arrangement for  Russia 
amounting to SDR 43  billion, about $ 6.5  billion. 
On the external side, in 1994 Russia recorded a large trade surplus, estimated at $19.8bn 
in  1994, compared with a surplus of about $12bn in  1993. Preliminary estimates put the 
trade balance for the first two months of 1995 at $2.9 billion. Those amounts, however, 
may be greatly over-estimated. Compliance of enterprises with reporting requirements is 
poor, and data are affected by a substantial degree of  under-recording, especially for im-
ports,  in  order to  escape tax payments.  In recent years trade and fmancial  transactions 
have been diverted away from traditional partners - the former CMEA and, even more, 
former  soviet  republics  - and  flows  have  been  redirected  towards  western  markets. 
Industrialized countries accounted for 69% of  total imports in 1994, compared to 60% in 
1993, while impvrts from former CMEA countries continued to decline and accounted for 
less than 8.5%. 
The external debt of Russia was estimated at $85bn at the end of 1994. Slightly less than 
90% of the total consists of debt contracted during the Soviet period, which was  taken 
over by Russia in early 1993. Starting in  1991, the USSR and then Russia were no longer 
able to meet all their debt servicing obligations, and started to -run up substantial arrears. 
Several temporary rescheduling agreements were reached with creditors, but these have 
now expired. Paris Club talks are about to restart, the IMF  loan now being approved. 
'Ihe mass privatization progranm1e has been highly successful, at  least when judged by 
its own terms. As a consequence ofthe first stage of privatization, ov~  15,000 large and 
medium-sized enterprises have been privatized since December 1992. The second stage 
of privatization began in mid-1994. This phase is based on sales of shares for cash. This 
impressive transfer of property rights to private agents did not coincide with substantial 
changes in the behaviour of  enterprises. Governance is still inadequate, insiders dominate 
tim1S,  and the budget constraint has not hardened enough. There is so far little evidence 
of enterprise  restructuring,  as  testified,  among  other  things,  by  the  low  rate  of 
redundancies.  There  has  been  no  attempt  by  the  authorities to  isolate 'bad'  fim1S  from 
viable ones, or to develop a strategy  for dealing with the worst loss-makers. 
Progress  with  the  creation  of a legislative  and  institutional  framework  for  a market 
economy  has  been  particularly  slow  and,  on  the  whole,  the  legal  and  institutional 
framework remains woefully deficient.  Much of the  reform effort has been enacted by 
presidential  decrees.  Implementing  legislation  has  often  been  lacking  as  Parliament 
disagreed with the measures, or simply failed  to follow them up. The resulting body of 
legislation is neither transparent nor consistent. The long-lasting legal uncertainty, due to 
major gaps in the legislation and controversial interpretations of existing noffi1S,  as well 
as to the inability to enforce contractual obligations, heavily constrains economic activity 
and particularly foreign  investments. 1be European Union and Russia:  the future  relationship 
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Cooperation between the European Union and Russia 
European  Union-Russia cooperation  has  been  built  up  through  implementation of the 
Tacis programme and  numerous other actions and programmes. 
The Tacis Prognunme 
Since its  inception in  1991  Tacis has striven to provide know-how to create the means 
and conditions for accelerating the transition to a democratic market society.  It has three 
main objectives : to support the transition towards the market economy and democracy, 
to  develop  partnerships  and  foster  links  and  networks  at  all  levels,  and  to  integrate 
recipient countries into the world economy. 
Tacis has as  its prioritY the need to contribute to structural reform and modernisation in 
the areas which play a key role in the transition process.  For this purpose, Tacis allocates 
grants  to  five  basic project types:  policy  advice,  institution-building and  restructuring, 
design  of legal  and  regulatory  frameworks,  training  and  pilot  projects.  Sectoral 
concentration is,  wherever possible,  combined with  geographical concentration.  South-
West Russia and Kaliningrad in  1994, North-West Russia and Baikal  in  1995. Tacis has 
concentrated on  the  following  sectors:  nuclear  safety  and  energy  (30  %);  support  for 
enterprises including privatisation,  military conversion and the fmancial sector (17 %); 
and  human  resources  development  (training,  public administration,  social policies and 
civic society) ( 16 %).  In addition Tacis has committed significant funds  in such sectors 
as transport, telecommunications, agriculture and the environment. Tacis works at every 
level in society, demonstrating new ideas and alternative ways of  organisation, providing 
policy advice, advisory and consultancy teams, training and studies,  it helps to develop 
new regulatory frameworks, reformed institutions and NGOs, and setting up partnerships 
and networks, twinning, pilot projects and framework  programmes. Mention should also 
be made of  the Special Privatizations and Restructuring Programme decided at the Tokyo 
Summit. 
Increasingly there is local participation in the design,  procedures and implementation of 
Tacis projects.  Local Coordinating Units, which are usually attached to a Minister with 
a seat in Cabinet, play a key role in identifYing the priority needs of  the partner countries, 
the priority sectors and geographical areas for assistance, and subsequently assessing and 
proposing activities to  be  funded  under the  annual  Action Programmes.  Considerable 
efforts have been made in view of giving more and better information on Tacis, in order 2-1 
to improve awareness among the recipients and local  populations, as well  as within the 
EU,  as to what Tacis is doing  an~ how it operates. 
In the past Tacis was criticised for  the slow rate at which commitments and payments 
were  made.  The  situation  changed,  thanks  to  the  introduction  of  multi-annual 
programming and a concerted effort  to  eliminate the  backlog of uncontracted projects 
built up in  1991  and  1992.  The table below clearly indicates the progress achieved; the 
fact  that  the  volume  of Tacis  projects  started  in  1994  exceeded  the  annual  budget, 
demonstrates that Tacis is catching up past backlogs. Russia's annual share of the above 
total  Tacis budget available for  national  programmes has  on average been 60 % (I 065 
MECU since  1991 ). 
Year  Budget  Contracts signed (MECU)  J>ayrrents mde (MEOJ) 
1991  396.5  5.3  0.4 
1992  420.0  203.0  32.1 
1993  475.0  348.0  180.3 
1994  460.0  512.0  300.0 
1995  506.85 
It is worth noting that staff levels  for  implementation of Tacis  are  far  below those  of 
other donor organizations. 
During  the  informal  meeting  of Foreign  Ministers  at  Carcassonne  in  March  1995, 
particular emphasis was  laid on the impor.ance of certain Tacis sectors, namely nuclear 
safety,  the  reinforcement  of democracy  and  civil  institutions,  education  and  training 
programmes and  policy  advice.  These areas  in  fact  absorb  a large  share of the Tacis 
national budget for Russia even before taking into account the nuclear safety programme 
which should be more easily implemented now that the memorandum on nuclear liability 
has  been  agreed.  Russia  receives  the  largest  share  of fi.mds  allocated  to  the Nuclear 
Safety programme (some  65  %out of a total  of 321  MECU)  and  a large share of the 
Inter-State  Programmes  (total  1992-1994:  200  MECU)  and  other  non-national  Tacis 
programmes. 
Assistance  in  support of the development  of the  enterprise  sector will  continue to  be 
necessary  in  Russia:  the  ability  of the  enterprise sector  to  develop  successfully  in  the 
short to medium term is severely constrained by lack of  effective fmancial intermediaries, 
insufficient management know-how,  particularly as  regards fmancial  management,  and 
lack of  an adequate regulatory and accounting and auditing infrastructure. This "systemic" 
problem also discourages the inflows of foreign capital vital for growth prospects. There 
is therefore a continued important role for Tacis assistance, working in close cooperation 
with  other donors,  in  helping to  improve  and  develop  the  whole  business system and 
institutions.  In  the  short  to  medium  term,  particular  attention  also  needs  to  be  paid, 
through Tacis and other donor programmes, the establishment of effective social policies 
mitigating the serious consequences of economic restructuring. 
lhe new  Tacis  regulation  emphasises  continuity  and  reform.  While  the  transfer  of 
Western know-how in support of the reform process should remain at the core of Tacis, -------------------------------
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proposed innovations include limited support for investment, cross-border infrastructures, 
emphasis on the regions and  multi-ann~! fmancial  and sectoral programming. 
Other actions and progr.unmes 
There are many other actions and programmes where the European Union cooperates with 
Russia,  as outlined below: 
Humanitarian assistance 
Russia is eligible to receive support from the European Union's food aid and humanitarian 
assistance  programmes,  should  the  need  arise.  Particularly  during  the  initial  phase 
following  the break-up of  the Soviet Union, the European Union provided massive food 
aid in the form of grants and loans with the aim of  cushioning the adverse effects of  the 
economic decline on the Russian population: 353 MECU in the form of  free food supplies 
and 999 MECU in the form of  credit guarantees and loans for food and medical supplies. 
In  addition  the  EU  provided  targeted  humanitarian  assistance  through  ECHO  to 
particularly vulnerable parts ofthe population.  In 1994 this totalled 9.16 MECU plus a 
small  amount  of a  global  programme  was  allocated  to  relieve  the  effects  of the 
Chernobyl  disaster.  Equally  the  fighting  in  the  Autonomous  Republic  of Chechnya 
created a massive humanitarian need for which the Commission's aid has been the largest 
single form of  assistance. To date 20.31  MECU is being provided to those affected in the 
Northern Caucasus and it has been distributed as far  as possible irrespective of political 
or ethnic considerations. 
Customs cooperation 
Russia  currently  benefits  from  a TACIS-fmanced programme  by  which  the  European 
Commission  works  with  the  State  Customs  Committee  of the  Russian  Federation  to 
upgrade the Russian customs ac!.1ninistration. 
Democrrx:y Programme 
The Democracy Programme, funded from Tacis so far as the CIS countries are concerned, 
is  designed  to  develop  democratic  practice  in  three  main  fields:  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge and techniques of parliamentary practice and organization by politicians and 
parliamentary  staff,  the  strengthening  of non-governmental  organizations  which  can 
contribute to the promotion of  a pluralist democratic society, and the transfer of  expertise 
and skills relating to democratic practice and the rule of law to professional groups and 
associations. The Democracy Programme contributed to one of  the first Common Actions 
implemented  by  the  European  Union  following  the entry  into  force  of the Treaty  on 
European Union, namely that relating to the observation of the  1993 elections in Russia. 
Energy and Energy  Charter 
Since  1992  the European Union has  been cooperating actively  in  the energy  field  with 
the Central and East  European countrieS, and the countries of the CIS, including Russia. 
Cooperation has  focussed  on the promotion of energy technologies and energy saving, 
through programmes such as THERMIE and the funding,  under the TACIS programme, 
of Energy Centres, three of which are in Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tyumen). The zs 
Energy Charter Treaty, concluded at Lisbon in December 1994, sets the framework for 
long-term cooperation in the energy sector among the signatories, including the European 
Union and Russia. Subjects covered by the Charter include the transit of energy, transfer 
of energy-related technology, promotion of investments and removal of trade barriers. 
In the energy sector, the SYNERGY programme is helping Russ'ia to make more effective 
policy decisions,  for  example in  the following areas:  advice on energy  legislation and 
regulation,  with  emphasis  on  the  European  Energy  Charter;  support  for  an  ongoing 
dialogue between the EU  and Russia on the social  and economic regeneration of coal 
mining areas;  fostering  the development of sustainable institutions to  improve energy 
efficiency. 
Interregional Cooperation 
In  1993,  along the  lines  of the scheme to encourage  cooperation  between  local  and 
regional authorities of  the European Union and those of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Commission extended the  ECOS-OUVERTURE cooperation programme  to  local  and 
regional authorities of the CIS states. It will be proposing, within the framework of the 
Tacis  Regulation,  to  render  this  type of cooperation  more  effective  by  allowing  the 
financing of the CIS partners taking part. 
Environment 
Environmental issues assume increasing priority in European Union/Russia relations. So 
far three Environmental Centres for Adwin!stration and Tedmo!ogy (ECATs) have been 
or are being set up in Russia (Kaliningrad, Moscow and St. Petersburg), the aim of  these 
LIFE-fmanced centres being to provide local  government and industry with support in 
their efforts to fmd environmentally sound solutions to problems in their areas. The 1995 
TACIS Action Programme gives special emphasis to the environmental dimension in the 
areas of  regional concentration, notably in the Baikal area in 1995. The LIFE Programme 
supports  sustainable  development  in  the  Baltic  Sea  region,  through  ECATs  in  St. 
Petersburg and Kaliningrad. 
Nuclear sqfety 
The European Union/Russia nuclear safety programme,  fi.mded  by  TACIS,  focusses  on 
four  different  but  complementary  topics:  assistance  on  six  nuclear  sites,  by  which 
experience  is  transferred in  the operation of nuclear plants;  design  safety,  comprising 
safety  studies  relating to  the  appraisal,  definition  and  remedial  proposals  for  WER, 
RBMK or fast breeder reactors; support to regulatory authorities for the development of 
a strong technical and legal basis in fields such as licensing, training and inspections; the 
waste and fuel  cycle, providing advice on management of waste and matters such as the 
transport of fuel.  A similar approach will apply to nuclear safeguards; 
Human wsources 
The  Trans-European  cooperation  scheme  for  higher  education  (TEMPUS),  which  is 
financed from TACIS, is designed to assist the Central and East European countries and Z4f 
the CIS states to restructure their higher education systems. Extended for a second four-
year  term,  it  has  been  open  to  Russia  since  1993  and  is  fmanced  under  the  TACIS 
programme. From 1995, the Youth for Europe III programme fmances youth exchanges 
and mobility schemes involving the European Union and third countries, including Russia. 
A meeting  of the  European  Union  and  Russia  Ministers  of Education  was  held  in 
September  1994, focussing on Russian educational reform and cooperation activities in 
the field  of education and training. 
Industrial Cooperation 
The  European  Union  is  seeking to promote industrial  cooperation with  Russia through 
pilot projects  and  the  provision of sectoral  analysis.  The pilot projects  have aimed  at 
building up common experience in the design and implementation of  cooperation projects, 
particularly  in  the  electrotechnical sector,  and  in the enhancement of Russian skills  in 
developing cooperation proposals. Sectoral analysis has concentrated on, inter alia, steel, 
aluminium,  the  wood  and  paper  industry,  the  aeronautics  industry,  textiles  and 
automobiles. 
Scientific Cooperation 
The European Union also supports reform in Russia through its activities of international 
cooperation in the field of science and technology. 
Urgent action has been taken in recent years:  research projects with the participation of 
Russian researchers have been supported by programmes such as COPERl\JICUS Goint 
projects and scientific networks) and PECO (participation in specific programmes of the 
Framework Programme), and through the International Association for the Promotion of 
Cooperation with Scientists from NIS (INT  AS) along the lines of  a recent communication 
from  the Commission to the Council (COM (95)  109). In all,  more than 50 MECU has 
been committed during  1993-1994 for cooperation of this type. 
These activities complement the initiatives undertaken by TACIS-fi.mded action in support 
of the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC), by which the European Union 
assists the conversion of military researchers to  civil applications.  Initiatives supported 
to date have aimed at giving assistance to a wide number of  researchers in srnalVmedium 
size projects. 
In  the  coming years,  priority  will  be  given  to  research  projects  having  high  potential 
applications both for  industry and the public domaine, which are likely to create nuclei 
for a renewed and reinvigorated  RID culture. 
Statistical Cooperation 
Since 1992 many actions, organized by Eurostat together with the statistical offices of the 
Member  States,  have  been  implemented  in  the  field  of statistical  cooperation.  Such 
actions,  fi.mded  by TACIS,  include consultancy, seminars, publications, study visits and 
training courses and the· supply of equipment. Transport and Trans-European Networks (TENs) 
In the transport field,  the Union is very active in promoting the integration of transport 
networks between the Union and Russia in a Trans-European Network perspective.  For 
road and rail transport, these cover important corridors such as that between Berlin and 
Moscow or between Helsinki-St. Petersburg-Moscow-Kiev (both identified as priorities 
by  the  Essen  European  Council),  and the G-24  is  coordinating international  fmancial 
assistance  to  these  corridors.  In the  ports  sector,  the  Union  is  an  active  partner to 
regional bodies in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea looking at ports developments in a 
regional context.  Furthermore, TACIS has identified air transport and  in  particular Air 
Traffic  Control  as  priority sectors within the transport sector,  and has  fmanced  many 
large-scale projects in these fields. 
Information Society 
There are many other areas of  activity where the European Union experience is assisting 
Russia to set aside its legacy of  the past in order to develop its resources in a sustainable 
manner.  Examples  include  the  Information  Society  where  the  European  Union  is 
providing advice to  the Russian  government on draft  laws  in  the information  sector, 
notably as  data protection and import/export of informational documents. 